Note: This editorial has been translated using AI machine translation (ChatGPT) tools. The original Bangla article titled "অসমাপ্ত জুলাই বিপ্লব পূর্ণ করুন" can be found here.
Mahmudur Rahman
Bangladesh’s Monsoon Revolution created an opportunity for a historic national unity against fascism.
In exchange for the martyrdom of over a thousand young students and citizens, we were able to liberate our homeland from the joint yoke of fascism and Indian hegemony. The people expected that under Professor Yunus’s leadership, a national government composed of all anti-fascist factions would assume the responsibility of governing the state until the next election. Unfortunately, on August 8 of last year, instead of a national or revolutionary government, an interim government was formed, primarily comprising representatives of the so-called civil society, and the expected broader political unity process of the people was not realized.
At the very start of state governance, in the joy of establishing the dominance of the civil society, a powerful advisor, in conversation with foreigners, excitedly mentioned that half a dozen representatives of a particular civil newspaper had secured places in the government. It was those foreigners who informed me of this. It is worth noting that in 2007, the same prominent editor of that civil newspaper publicly rebuked the then Information Advisor Mainul Hosein, saying that it was they who had formed that government. This group has always wielded influence in every regime. Recently, that editor has begun harshly criticizing Dr. Yunus.
After the formation of the government, we saw that all the smart Bangladeshis working abroad were being appointed to various posts such as advisors, special assistants, and advisors to advisors. We were delighted to discover so many highly talented Bangladeshis. However, the problem is that although they may be highly educated and skilled, they are not only unfamiliar with Bangladesh but also lack experience in working in this country’s environment—particularly not at policy-making levels. As a result, nine months after the formation of the government, we see that not only has no reform been implemented, but only rounds and rounds of discussions have occurred. I fear that various reform proposals will remain unresolved and, without any political consensus on reform, Dr. Yunus’s government will ultimately have to leave power. Furthermore, unfortunately, in just nine months, attempts to destabilize the government with hundreds of demands have been observed. Additionally, when various quarters repeatedly questioned the government’s mandate, the inexperienced advisory council failed to provide appropriate responses.
Meanwhile, even before the momentum of the revolution had subsided, a power struggle began between Bangladesh’s two main political parties outside the banned Awami League—BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. The conflict over how many followers of each party would be placed in key positions in the Secretariat and judiciary escalated from disagreements to physical altercations. It seemed to me that after being suddenly freed from the dreadful repression of the Awami League and the left for fifteen years, Jamaat-e-Islami became overly self-confident relative to its actual public support and organizational strength. Especially since Islami Chhatra Shibir played a significant role in the July Revolution, Jamaat-e-Islami sought to claim its share quickly in the new political arrangement. They possibly forgot that their support is not yet widespread across the country. The pockets of strength and support they have should not tempt them to dream of power in the near future. With a reasonably honorable number of seats, they can at best hope for the dignity of being in the opposition in parliament.
This post-revolution friction has made the BNP—eager to ascend to power quickly and far stronger in public support and organization—extremely angry at Jamaat’s show of strength. Within days of Hasina’s flight, the BNP-Jamaat conflict began surfacing publicly. In fact, since 2014, distance had grown between BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. The surprising participation of Jamaat leaders under BNP’s sheaf of paddy symbol in the 2018 night-time vote election widened that gap rather than narrowing it. The BNP leaders who were deprived of those seats in favor of Jamaat were understandably enraged. From that point, the two parties became rivals. When BNP officially dissolved the 20-party alliance in 2022—four years after that so-called election—it became clear that BNP and Jamaat would eventually emerge as fierce competitors. In the current context, there is a risk that the BNP-Jamaat rivalry may become more bitter than the conflict between Awami League and BNP. Signs of this likely bitterness are also visible in the recent closeness between the BNP and left-leaning political groups.
The India-leaning left group, which rode on the back of the Awami League and enjoyed power for fifteen years, oppressed dissent, promoted India’s anti-Islam narrative, and played the role of fascism’s accomplice, wasted no time in taking advantage of the BNP-Jamaat conflict. These leftist politicians, disconnected from the masses, always align under the umbrella of a major party to protect their interests. Exploiting the disunity among anti-fascist forces and BNP’s gradual tilt toward center-left, they have managed to infiltrate the party founded by martyr Zia. The same leftist and civil media outlets that had long campaigned against the Zia family and BNP are now shifting allegiance seeing the nationalist party nearing power. The BNP leadership, too, has welcomed them, forgetting the past. That is the opportunistic nature of power politics. In today’s reality, the BNP now sees Islamism—labeled “Islamist”—rather than Awami League’s India-leaning stance, as its main rival.
Although a third political force comprising young students began to emerge outside BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, it has yet to mature. In the 1970s, martyr Zia formed BNP primarily from pro-China leftists and Islamists. Though BNP became one of Bangladesh’s largest parties, internal ideological conflicts never ended. Leaders have coexisted under one umbrella for power-sharing, but the ideological battle has continued. For the past decade, the rise of leftists and India-leaning individuals in BNP has increasingly alienated the Islamists. The recent welcome of so-called clean-image Awami League members into the party signals a shift in BNP’s political ideology. Even in the students’ new party NCP, a mix of Islamists and leftists reminiscent of the 1970s BNP has created visible ideological divides. Additionally, since most leaders come from the same generation, leadership conflict seems almost inevitable. Outside the NCP, several platforms led by student leaders from the July Revolution have also emerged. Unless they are united into a broader alliance, we will have to wait longer for the rise of a third political force capable of challenging BNP and Jamaat.
The million-dollar question is: what lies ahead for Awami-leaning politics? While the return of the Awami League as a party seems unlikely, at least 20% of their loyal supporters remain in the country. The BNP has already opened its doors to them. Some in the NCP leadership seem inclined to recruit Awami supporters by adopting rhetoric close to the Awami League’s Liberation War narrative. I believe Awami League’s grassroots workers and supporters will seek security in the new circumstances and gravitate toward the BNP, which now stands at the threshold of power. Also, since India appears to have gained confidence in BNP, Awami supporters likely won’t object to joining BNP en masse. For some time, BNP has used the weaknesses of Dr. Yunus’s government to assert its political authority. Meanwhile, the army chief’s recent remarks have further weakened the government. The question now is whether a serving army chief has the authority to speak about the government in such a way. In this situation, the interim government has effectively become a lame duck. I see no justification for dragging along this weak government. However, if Dr. Yunus’s government is forced to depart under current conditions, India’s plans in Bangladesh will succeed. Unfortunately, the political parties trying to blackmail this government are perhaps ignoring this danger.
Just a couple of months ago, during Eid-ul-Fitr at the National Eidgah, Dr. Yunus seemed to be Bangladesh’s most popular ruler based on the people’s spontaneous enthusiasm. Today, he appears surprisingly feeble before BNP’s partial organizational strength.
Though the people overthrew Sheikh Hasina in the July Revolution, unfortunately, the post-revolution government failed to rid Bangladesh of Indian hegemony’s agents. No effective steps have been taken to identify and uproot the Indian agents who infiltrated every level of the state, including political parties, between 2007 and 2024—a span of 17 years. Upon returning to Bangladesh after six years in exile, I told Professor Yunus more than once: “Either rule or quit.” Due to his inexperience in politics, he likely did not grasp my message. He, his advisors, and student leaders entered a kind of self-congratulatory comfort zone. They felt no need to heed the advice of outside well-wishers. The failure of this government, and the rashness and lust for power of the politicians, has once again opened the door for Indian intervention in Bangladesh’s politics.
With a call to prepare again to complete the unfinished July Revolution, I conclude today’s special commentary.
