Friday, May 23, 2025

Complete the Unfinished July Revolution - Mahmudur Rahman

Note: This editorial has been translated using AI machine translation (ChatGPT) tools. The original Bangla article titled "অসমাপ্ত জুলাই বিপ্লব পূর্ণ করুন" can be found here.

Mahmudur Rahman

Bangladesh’s Monsoon Revolution created an opportunity for a historic national unity against fascism.
In exchange for the martyrdom of over a thousand young students and citizens, we were able to liberate our homeland from the joint yoke of fascism and Indian hegemony. The people expected that under Professor Yunus’s leadership, a national government composed of all anti-fascist factions would assume the responsibility of governing the state until the next election. Unfortunately, on August 8 of last year, instead of a national or revolutionary government, an interim government was formed, primarily comprising representatives of the so-called civil society, and the expected broader political unity process of the people was not realized.

At the very start of state governance, in the joy of establishing the dominance of the civil society, a powerful advisor, in conversation with foreigners, excitedly mentioned that half a dozen representatives of a particular civil newspaper had secured places in the government. It was those foreigners who informed me of this. It is worth noting that in 2007, the same prominent editor of that civil newspaper publicly rebuked the then Information Advisor Mainul Hosein, saying that it was they who had formed that government. This group has always wielded influence in every regime. Recently, that editor has begun harshly criticizing Dr. Yunus.

After the formation of the government, we saw that all the smart Bangladeshis working abroad were being appointed to various posts such as advisors, special assistants, and advisors to advisors. We were delighted to discover so many highly talented Bangladeshis. However, the problem is that although they may be highly educated and skilled, they are not only unfamiliar with Bangladesh but also lack experience in working in this country’s environment—particularly not at policy-making levels. As a result, nine months after the formation of the government, we see that not only has no reform been implemented, but only rounds and rounds of discussions have occurred. I fear that various reform proposals will remain unresolved and, without any political consensus on reform, Dr. Yunus’s government will ultimately have to leave power. Furthermore, unfortunately, in just nine months, attempts to destabilize the government with hundreds of demands have been observed. Additionally, when various quarters repeatedly questioned the government’s mandate, the inexperienced advisory council failed to provide appropriate responses.

Meanwhile, even before the momentum of the revolution had subsided, a power struggle began between Bangladesh’s two main political parties outside the banned Awami League—BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. The conflict over how many followers of each party would be placed in key positions in the Secretariat and judiciary escalated from disagreements to physical altercations. It seemed to me that after being suddenly freed from the dreadful repression of the Awami League and the left for fifteen years, Jamaat-e-Islami became overly self-confident relative to its actual public support and organizational strength. Especially since Islami Chhatra Shibir played a significant role in the July Revolution, Jamaat-e-Islami sought to claim its share quickly in the new political arrangement. They possibly forgot that their support is not yet widespread across the country. The pockets of strength and support they have should not tempt them to dream of power in the near future. With a reasonably honorable number of seats, they can at best hope for the dignity of being in the opposition in parliament.

This post-revolution friction has made the BNP—eager to ascend to power quickly and far stronger in public support and organization—extremely angry at Jamaat’s show of strength. Within days of Hasina’s flight, the BNP-Jamaat conflict began surfacing publicly. In fact, since 2014, distance had grown between BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. The surprising participation of Jamaat leaders under BNP’s sheaf of paddy symbol in the 2018 night-time vote election widened that gap rather than narrowing it. The BNP leaders who were deprived of those seats in favor of Jamaat were understandably enraged. From that point, the two parties became rivals. When BNP officially dissolved the 20-party alliance in 2022—four years after that so-called election—it became clear that BNP and Jamaat would eventually emerge as fierce competitors. In the current context, there is a risk that the BNP-Jamaat rivalry may become more bitter than the conflict between Awami League and BNP. Signs of this likely bitterness are also visible in the recent closeness between the BNP and left-leaning political groups.

The India-leaning left group, which rode on the back of the Awami League and enjoyed power for fifteen years, oppressed dissent, promoted India’s anti-Islam narrative, and played the role of fascism’s accomplice, wasted no time in taking advantage of the BNP-Jamaat conflict. These leftist politicians, disconnected from the masses, always align under the umbrella of a major party to protect their interests. Exploiting the disunity among anti-fascist forces and BNP’s gradual tilt toward center-left, they have managed to infiltrate the party founded by martyr Zia. The same leftist and civil media outlets that had long campaigned against the Zia family and BNP are now shifting allegiance seeing the nationalist party nearing power. The BNP leadership, too, has welcomed them, forgetting the past. That is the opportunistic nature of power politics. In today’s reality, the BNP now sees Islamism—labeled “Islamist”—rather than Awami League’s India-leaning stance, as its main rival.

Although a third political force comprising young students began to emerge outside BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, it has yet to mature. In the 1970s, martyr Zia formed BNP primarily from pro-China leftists and Islamists. Though BNP became one of Bangladesh’s largest parties, internal ideological conflicts never ended. Leaders have coexisted under one umbrella for power-sharing, but the ideological battle has continued. For the past decade, the rise of leftists and India-leaning individuals in BNP has increasingly alienated the Islamists. The recent welcome of so-called clean-image Awami League members into the party signals a shift in BNP’s political ideology. Even in the students’ new party NCP, a mix of Islamists and leftists reminiscent of the 1970s BNP has created visible ideological divides. Additionally, since most leaders come from the same generation, leadership conflict seems almost inevitable. Outside the NCP, several platforms led by student leaders from the July Revolution have also emerged. Unless they are united into a broader alliance, we will have to wait longer for the rise of a third political force capable of challenging BNP and Jamaat.

The million-dollar question is: what lies ahead for Awami-leaning politics? While the return of the Awami League as a party seems unlikely, at least 20% of their loyal supporters remain in the country. The BNP has already opened its doors to them. Some in the NCP leadership seem inclined to recruit Awami supporters by adopting rhetoric close to the Awami League’s Liberation War narrative. I believe Awami League’s grassroots workers and supporters will seek security in the new circumstances and gravitate toward the BNP, which now stands at the threshold of power. Also, since India appears to have gained confidence in BNP, Awami supporters likely won’t object to joining BNP en masse. For some time, BNP has used the weaknesses of Dr. Yunus’s government to assert its political authority. Meanwhile, the army chief’s recent remarks have further weakened the government. The question now is whether a serving army chief has the authority to speak about the government in such a way. In this situation, the interim government has effectively become a lame duck. I see no justification for dragging along this weak government. However, if Dr. Yunus’s government is forced to depart under current conditions, India’s plans in Bangladesh will succeed. Unfortunately, the political parties trying to blackmail this government are perhaps ignoring this danger.

Just a couple of months ago, during Eid-ul-Fitr at the National Eidgah, Dr. Yunus seemed to be Bangladesh’s most popular ruler based on the people’s spontaneous enthusiasm. Today, he appears surprisingly feeble before BNP’s partial organizational strength.

Though the people overthrew Sheikh Hasina in the July Revolution, unfortunately, the post-revolution government failed to rid Bangladesh of Indian hegemony’s agents. No effective steps have been taken to identify and uproot the Indian agents who infiltrated every level of the state, including political parties, between 2007 and 2024—a span of 17 years. Upon returning to Bangladesh after six years in exile, I told Professor Yunus more than once: “Either rule or quit.” Due to his inexperience in politics, he likely did not grasp my message. He, his advisors, and student leaders entered a kind of self-congratulatory comfort zone. They felt no need to heed the advice of outside well-wishers. The failure of this government, and the rashness and lust for power of the politicians, has once again opened the door for Indian intervention in Bangladesh’s politics.

With a call to prepare again to complete the unfinished July Revolution, I conclude today’s special commentary.

Monday, August 12, 2024

Bangladesh is free for now, but we need to remain vigilant



Now that Hasina has fled the country in the face of a student-led revolution, a new interim government under Dr. Yunus has come into power, and some attempts at a counter-coup have been foiled, maybe we can begin to breathe a small sigh of relief. There is still so much to be done, but now some of the initial uncertainty has been alleviated, especially ways of counter-coup by the legislative assembly (the parliament assembly was dissolved on very first day), and the judiciary (the chief justice was forced to resign, as well as all judges of apellate division as well; Attorney General also said they would initiate reforms in the HC soon).  

Yes Sheikh Mujib statues have been pulled to the ground, and beautiful calligraphy has begun to adorn the streets in places (hereherehere). But there are uglier ways in which things are recalibrating after decades of Awami looting and takeover - see events of unrest fomented at Islami Bank (to remove S.Alom group influence) and IIUC (to remove Abu Reza Nadvi loyalists). I won't comment much on these matters except that Jamaat people have been most mercilessly victimised during Awami misrule; it is what is it.  

Political detainees arrested in the fast few weeks have been released. And some detainees of enforced disappearance, such as Mir Ahmad Bin Quasem and Abdullahil Aman Azmi, but not all, have been released as well.

The new Bangladesh overwhelms one with hope, although the danger is still out there - the spectre of communal riots, despite being proven fake again and again (Aljazeera news, Deshbhakt report, Rumour Scanner tweets (part 1, part 2)), could spoil the image of Bangladesh and invite adverse reactions from an oversensitized world eager to play the minority saviour card (unless the minority in question is Muslim). 

Many, including Mahmudur Rahman and Farhad Mazhar, are calling on the government to be declared a revolutionary government instead of an interim government, mainly due to the myriad problems of ruling under the constraints of the current constitution, and the current President Shahabuddin who was a Hasina appointed loyalist. Mazhar has been calling for the suspension of the current constitution, and assumption of Dr. Yunus the post of President of the revolutionary government. This call has strengthened after Joy, Hasina's son, in his latest interview, claimed that his mother the ex-Prime Minister Hasina, had not really resigned, and was still the legitimate leader. This is a stark departure from his first interview, where he said Sheikh Hasina would not return to politics. His shifting views are clearly an indication that although the first video may have been genuine, the other interviews are scripted, and most probably written and directed by Indian RAW operatives behind the cameras.

Indian interference, especially on the issue of inflaming minorities tensions, after having failed in bringing about an army coup, police coup, legislative coup and finally the judicial coup, is actually making the Bangladeshi people aware to the very problem of Indian interference, something that India has successfully tried to keep hidden till now. But desperate times elicit sometimes stupid reactions, as we have seen from Hasina a few days back, and are seeing from India now. Mahmudur Rahman has explained the issue of Indian hegemony beautifully here, and a letter from five citizens of different SAARC nations calling for Indian interference (read hegemony) to stop should be enough to help one understand what the issue is all about at the moment.

At the moment, while many are tensed and turning in their beds regarding what will happen with elections, will the interim government turn into another dictatorial tool itself, or will Sheikh Hasina come back to usurp power, I am in general not worried and have nothing to add to the debate really. The students have repeatedly shown they are more mature than we think - see condition of roads under students, the guarding of temples, etc (although some have voiced concern that students inside the government could compromise their position overall). In any case, it will not be easy to bring back the law and order situation of a country torn asunder by Sheikh Hasina's divisive policies over 16 years of misrule - the fact that police have just agreed to return to work is an encouraging sign; and a big alhamdulillah it is the police and not the military ushering in curfews to control the looting and revenge attacks against ex-regime people, although the military was deployed to control Awami League inspired violence in Gopalganj few days back.

Regarding recommendations, I am not really placed to suggest any. But if I were given to state my pick(s), I would say - (1) dismantle the hugely controversial ICT and reverse its politically biased judgements that polarised and tore the country over the past 14 years, (2) constitute a national justice and reconciliation process to bring all the criminals (whether they have fled, or are still under some guise in government, army or judiciary) involved with torture, blatant corruption, human rights violations, et al. to justice and give victims their due justice, and (3) restructure the army to secure the real troubles that will start now - a belligerent India, the persecuted Rohingya in Myanmar (see earlier post about army and possible changes). 

At the end of the day, it is about bringing back trust in public institutions, and in ability of due political process to address public grievances, as well as the ability of due judicial process to ensure justice. Without that, there is no possibility of change. 

There is still a lot more to unpack, such as a blueprint towards normalcy, but it is too early to even begin to contemplate about it. However, I do agree with Pinaki it is necessary to get everything up and running, and he has a nice list of things that need to be addressed on his youtube untold series. However, let us leave it here for the moment.

Saturday, August 3, 2024

We want our fathers and brothers back: Free victims of Enforced Disappearance #StudentProtests2024


One of the darkest crimes committed by the Hasina regime has been enforced disappearance. According to human rights organizations, more than 600 people have been disappeared since the Awami League government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina came to power in 2009. Few have returned to tell the tale, among them Hummam Quader Chowdhury, and Sukharanjan Bali. Hummam, abducted in 2016, was released after less than a year in March 2017, his family supposedly paying a huge sum of money to authorities for his release. Sukharanjan Bali, a key defence witness in the case of Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, was abducted by plainclothed police on 5 November 2012 from the gate of Supreme Court before he could testify, and surfaced many months later, suffering in Kolkata's Dumdum prison. 

Nobody knows the whereabouts of those who have been abducted, even whether they are alive or dead. But one thing is certain, Sheikh Hasina and her cohorts are behind these enforced disappearances. According to a close associate of Hasina, a number of different state agencies are involved in the dozens of people picked up and secretly detained including the paramilitary organisation, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the detective branch of the police, the counter-terrorism unit, the special branch and DGFI. In atleast the case of one detainee, Mir Ahmad Bin Quasem, he was abducted on direct orders of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Hasina is said to have given Bangladesh's military intelligence agency Directorate General of Forces Intelligence(DGFI) “clearance” to illegally pick up Mir Ahmad, as part of the government's widening crackdown on the country's opposition in 2016.

On August 14, Netra News revealed that Bangladesh officials were allegedly holding and torturing victims of enforced disappearance at a secret detention site called Aynaghar (house of mirrors). It is thought that the military detention centre in the heart of the army cantonment inside Dhaka had detained victims of disappearances including Mir Ahmad Bin Quasem Arman and Abdullahil Aman Azmi. Authorities in Bangladesh often deny the involvement of state agencies in enforced disappearances, and Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal has even told Al Jazeera, “Those who are missing are mostly hiding by themselves,” adding that police have already solved many of the disappeared cases. However, as report, after report, after damning report has concluded, the Bangladeshi government is the sole perpetrator of such enforced disappearances. As per a Human Rights Watch report in 2021, based on over 115 interviews conducted between July 2020 and March 2021 with victims, their family members, and witnesses to enforced disappearances, atleast 86 victims of disappearance still remain missing.

As the tyrant falls, we demand that these victims be immediately released from the secret detention camps of Sheikh Hasina. We also demand that the perpetrators of these human rights abuses, members of RAB, DGFI and the army, as well as Sheikh Hasina herself, face justice for their crimes against humanity. 

আয়নাঘর মুক্ত করেন!

Free the prisoners of Aynaghar!

Free victims of #EnforcedDisappearance in #Bangladesh NOW!